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FOREWORD: THE STRUCTURES OF CARE WORK
KATHARINE

B. SILBAUGH*

A fantastic amount of activity is brewing around the subject of
care work-meeting the needs of children, the elderly, the sick, or the
disabled. 1 The family, which has been the primary repository of care
responsibilities, has gone through an irreversible transformation in
terms of expectations, aspirations, conduct, stability, composition, and
abilities.
These changes raise questions about the efficacy of
assigning care solely to the family, and they also bring to light several
kinds of persistent justice problems raised by that allocation. As the
roles and expectations of both men and women have evolved in the
family, in the workforce, and in civic life, the institutional
arrangements that have dominated care work for the past century
have proved themselves to be in need of significant re-envisioning.
People are now asking questions about care work along a
multitude of axes. Who cares for society's dependents? where and
how? who pays for that care? how and how much? who generates the
standards for that care? and why? who benefits from that care? in
what ways? and what are their responsibilities? How do society's
institutions, the market (and the private institutions that compete in
it), governments, and the family respond to, accommodate, allocate,
pay for, and benefit from the care of dependents? What does care
mean-how is it defined, and what is its meaning in the life and for
the identities of those who give it? What are the consequences of the
human need for care in terms of the economic well-being, citizenship
status, workforce equality, strength, power, and emotional welfare of
caregivers? How should care be conceptualized- as work, as civic
obligation, as recreation or consumption, as familial or social,
liberating or constraining for individuals, or both, and in what ways?
How should we address the justice and equity issues raised by care

* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
1. This use of the term care work is meant to call up the material work itself, as distinct
from the set of feminist claims often discussed under the heading of an "ethic of care," per
CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982).
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work, including its increasing transfer to the market, along race,
gender, and class lines?
The questions are being asked and answered toward so many
different ends that the work in the field defies easy organization.
Scholars interested in women, in citizenship and civil society, in
equality, in race, in childhood well-being, in poverty and economic
stratification, in social welfare programs, in the labor force, in
workers' rights, and in family form, are coming to see questions
surrounding care work as significant to their academic investigations.
Conflicts have begun to arise in the literature on the topic, both over
the best means to common goals and over the goals themselves. This
Symposium is the first collection of some of the primary legal voices
on the subject of care work. It is timely, as the literature has
developed rapidly in the past five years. I will here introduce the
articles in this Symposium, but the reader will need to delve into the
texts themselves to obtain a full understanding of the arguments.
The Symposium is made up of six principal articles by Martha
Fineman, Joan Williams, Lucie White, Dorothy Roberts, Mary
Romero, and Linda McLain, and seven equally interesting
commentaries by Mary Becker, Katherine Franke, Michael Selmi,
Kathy Abrams, Katharine Baker, Martha Ertman, and Mary Anne
Case. Three of the principal articles, by Fineman, Williams, and
McLain, are primarily devoted to broad theoretical argument
mapping out our current care work delivery system, and making the
case that the current system is unjust and demands a public response
of some kind. The other three principal articles examine aspects of
the care work system as practiced. Lucie White considers care work
in a Head Start program, Dorothy Roberts considers care work in
kinship networks under the supervision of the foster care system, and
Mary Romero examines care work as experienced by workers who
deliver care work for pay, and the children of those workers. In
addition, most of the commentators have used this forum expansively
to raise significant practical and theoretical issues presented by the
burgeoning care work debate at large, as well as within this
Symposium. A number of the commentaries could serve as standalone articles in their own right. We are fortunate to have so many
substantial arguments together in one place.
The Symposium begins with articles by Martha Fineman and
Joan Williams, both of whom have established themselves as the
anchors of the legal academy's movement to theorize care work. In
the past several years they each have engaged in sustained research
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projects digging into some of the most fundamental problems
presented by the structures of care work,2 and their articles here
further develop themes raised in past work. They each creatively
envision more just and workable arrangements, involving fundamental restructuring of social institutions.
Broadly speaking,
Fineman focuses on re-envisioning the relationship between the
family and both the state and the market as repositories of
responsibility for care work, while Williams focuses on achieving
accommodations from employers that will assist workers in spending
more time with their own dependents. In part this is a difference of
political strategy-Fineman does not hold back, in the face of likely
resistance, on a theoretical vision for social organization as it ought to
be, while Williams wants to see changes that are possible within the
political constraints we face now.
Using the concept of the social contract, Martha Fineman
establishes that the allocation of the costs of the care of dependents to
the private family under current social conditions is unjust given the
benefits that go to society at large from that care. In a sense, it is not
a deal that can be sustained long-term in the face of family changes
and the changing status of women. She reminds us that society is full
of dependents of all sorts, and that all people are at some time, and
often many times, dependent, and those who care for them become
themselves dependent on either state or family. She believes the
costs of care work to caregivers ought to be distributed socially,
through subsidies that compensate as well as accommodate, just as
the costs of other public goods are subsidized. She continues from
past work her explicit rejection of the notion of independence for
individuals, arguing that subsidy is pervasive in the culture, and
independence is neither desirable, nor attainable.' Instead, Fineman
argues that the concept of independence is used to distinguish and
punish, where real distinction can be exposed as illusory. The rightsbased leverage she might be giving up by admitting dependency, she
reclaims by universalizing dependency, and thereby eroding the status
within the social contract afforded to those who make a claim to
being self-sufficient. While Fineman wants to see a change in the
2. In particular, see MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); JOAN WILLIAMS,
UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CoNFLI'cr AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
(2000); Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence,
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 13 (1999).
3. This argument directly conflicts with a recent one made on behalf of independence,
Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000).
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structure of the workplace so that the market sphere can bear its
share of the costs of care, her sustained focus is on the need for a
significant change in the relationship between family and state.
Williams explores care work through a system she calls
domesticity, which organizes gender relations as well as market and
family relations around care work. Domesticity includes resistance to
capitalism's emphasis on self-interest, competition, and the individual,
the spiritualization of care and housework, the feminization of care
work, the ideology of intensive mothering, and the uncompensated
(noncommodified) nature of care work. Williams uses her own
unique blend of postmodernism and practical political strategy to
make a number of arguments about the process of change that is
needed. First, Williams notes that aspects of domesticity are positive
for many parents who value a "norm of parental care."' 4 At the same
time, domesticity has significant costs for many, including racial
minorities, white women, gender nonconformists, and the childless.
The dual nature of domesticity has produced feminist advocates of
both the elimination of domesticity through women's greater paid
labor force participation, and advocates of the elimination of
domesticity through materializing and compensating the work of
domesticity. Williams emphasizes that each camp needs to stop
attacking the other camp "on the grounds that they reinscribe
domesticity while we destabilize it. We all reinscribe domesticity,"
because it is not sensible to talk about a position from far outside
such a constitutive system.' Thus an effective change strategy must
acknowledge what Williams calls "domesticity in drag."'6 That is, it
must make gender trouble by reproducing numerous aspects of
gendered identities within domesticity simultaneous with subversive
confusion and localized disruptions of those identities. Williams
draws on the postmodern ideas of Judith Butler in considering
constraints on the transformation of gendered identities.
At the same time, Williams can be exceedingly politically
pragmatic. This shows in her preference for workplace accommodation over state subsidy for care based on the current political
resistance to state subsidy in general. It also shows in her desire as a
social persuader to use the language of domesticity to draw people
into political alliance. She wants to engage the public's sense that
4. Joan Williams, From Difference to Dominance to Domesticity: Care As Work, Gender
As Tradition, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1441, 1471 (2001).
5. Id. at 1491 (citations omitted).
6. Id. at 1445.
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children need time with parents to demand that employers provide
that time without penalty, arguing that "we need to use domesticity
because its patterning lends resonance, familiarity, and authority to
our proposals."'7 She thus relies on Judith Butler's insights to argue
that feminists need to use domesticity's feminine gender performance
''8
so as not to appear "out to lunch.
Because they set out two of the more foundational arguments in
the volume, I invited three commentators, Mary Becker, Katherine
Franke, and Michael Selmi to offer thoughts on the two articles as a
pair. Katherine Franke, using historical materials illuminating the
transformation of African American status from slavery to citizenship, draws an analogy with a warning: that a transformation in
responsibility for care from the private family to state or market is not
one from clear bad to clear good. It is instead "to exchange one
practice of rule-the private family-for another set of regulatory
governance practices, those imbued in the state and the market."9
The warning does not propose an alternative to the state so much as
remind that the state will define the meaning of dependency, and that
it has not always done so with the good of the dependent at heart.
Becker comments on Fineman and Williams with approval amidst
particular questions for each that might strengthen their analyses.
Becker's article in large part defends Fineman and Williams against a
charge that their proposals assume maternalism for women, to
women's detriment. She does this through an examination of just that
argument made by Katherine Franke against excessive "repronormativity" in feminist scholarship, with a thorough point by point
response that is usefully read in a pair with Franke's repronormativity
article. 10
Finally, Michael Selmi questions whether women's inequality in
the paid labor market is attributable to care responsibilities, rather
than to some other form of discrimination." He questions any
employer obligation to accommodate care responsibilities.
He
expresses a preference for solving care problems with greater equality
of care responsibility between the sexes, as he is skeptical that
meaningful part-time work could be accomplished in the real world
7. Id. at 1490.
8. Id.
9. Katherine M. Franke, Taking Care,76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1541, 1544 (2001).
10. Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001).
11. In this Selmi echoes the argument made in Schultz, supra note 3, at 1945.
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without a penalty for women. In a sense, his critique shows greater
confidence in the ability to change gendered behavior of individuals
in families than the norm of employer (and male) prerogatives in the
paid labor force. Putting the debate in its extreme for the purpose of
contrast, Selmi sees an intransigent workplace on discrimination
issues and so looks to the family for evolution toward equality, while
care work feminists see an intransigently gendered family and look to
the workplace for evolution toward equality.12
The Symposium next turns to questions of care work as
practiced. Lucie White writes an intriguing account of care as
practiced in a Head Start program in Los Angeles in the early 1990s.
White daringly sets out a moral content to the act of care, under the
right circumstances, where parents meet one another in loosely
organized public spaces such as Head Start centers to care for
children. Head Start has a particular set of legal rules that require
giving parents a number of opportunities to participate in the centers
either as parent-volunteers or as paid teachers. She describes how
one mother, through acts of care for a challenging student at the
center, demonstrated to herself that she could bring forth "what it
took-the creativity, the patience, and the sheer, groundless hope-to
be an effective agent of change."13 This was among a number of
relationships White describes at Head Start that are characterized by
"mutual presence."'14 White links this very personal, nondelegable
experience of intensive "long-term mentoring relationships for
individual women," with questions about how a Head Start classroom
becomes a "beloved community," a moral project. 5 She wonders
how the voices of people involved in such street-level projects can
inform social policy questions surrounding care work.

12. The debate raises the interesting question of why scholars choose to be more optimistic
about change in one sphere than the other. Selmi and Schultz are primarily employment law
scholars, and probably are more intimately familiar with the workings of the labor market than
are many of the family law scholars in this Symposium. They both see the workplace itself as
the significant generator of inequality. Family law scholars generally see intimate relations as
the more significant source. When we study something in great detail, are its problems inclined
to seem more troublesome and intractable? Do we underestimate the difficulties generated by
relations outside the field that we study intensively, relative to the difficulties generated by
relations within the field we study intensively? (The tendencies I am describing do not apply to
all the scholars of the work-family conflict, a number of whom are well-schooled in both family
behavior and labor market data.)
13. Lucie E. White, Raced Histories, Mother Friendships, and the Power of Care:
Conversationswith Women in Project HeadStart, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1569, 1599 (2001).
14. Id.at 1601.
15. Id.at 1602-03.
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Kathy Abrams responds to White with a commentary that
praises the new literature on care work for its significant improvements on the first wave of legal feminist argument on care, the one
that essentialized care as a characteristic of women's moral thought.
In the new debate, care work is "recognized as a complex set of
practices that are structured, supported, and incentivized by a range
of institutional decisions and social norms, and that differentiate and
position women in relation to each other."'16 In addition to describing
care as a practice rather than a characteristic, the new writing on care
is also more sensitive to effects of the marginalized position of
caregivers, and remedial arguments now "acknowledge and respond
to the possibility of care's devaluation."' 7 At the same time, Abrams
argues that this second round of debate about care, like the first, is a
challenge to translate into conventional claims for legal intervention,
because today's arguments require major restructuring of many
fundamental social institutions. Here Abrams sees hope in White's
approach in this Symposium. White is explicit about the role of legal
intervention, saying only that it might work, for some people, when it
occurs amidst the right mix of street-level institutions and public
culture, such as those at play in the Los Angeles Head Start program
she studied. That is to say, White is arguing that legal regulation
might make it more likely that certain practices will emerge, without
making a claim that law will make such practices emerge all the time,
in the same way for all people.
Next Dorothy Roberts considers the way care is practiced in
kinship networks monitored or facilitated by the public child welfare
system, and in so doing she illustrates some of the consequences of
allocating responsibility for care work to the private family. She
argues that the recently popular kinship foster care replaces a
traditional, private African American family arrangement with a
similar structure that is regulated by state child welfare agencies.
Because foster care arrangements receive a higher subsidy than that
available from welfare, many families opt to surrender their children
to the foster care system, with its more stringent supervision, in
exchange for the higher level of support. She describes the risk of the
broader family network losing custody altogether once a voluntary
placement occurs. She argues that "[t]he transformation of kinship

16. Kathryn Abrams, The Second Coming of Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1605, 1606
(2001).
17. Id.
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care from a private to a state-run arrangement suppresses the
historical strengths of this family form," as caseworkers do not
involve extended family. networks in long-term planning for the
child. 18 The state provides financial incentives for poor families to
seek state-supervised fostering relationships, but Roberts warns of
the dangers of state appropriation of the care arrangements of lowincome African American families. The child welfare system, she
argues, is built on the idea that "children's basic needs for sustenance
and development will and can be met solely by parents."' 19 It is based
on a vision of privatized care of children, one that rejects any
collective responsibility for them. The child welfare system intervenes on what it must therefore view as pathological need, and then
spends $1 billion a year "on maintaining poor children as state wards
outside their homes, but only a fraction of that on child welfare
services to intact families. ' 20 Roberts's article in some ways illustrates
the concern of Katherine Franke-that in practice, state assistance
with care responsibilities may be punitive and may subject care
workers to a new set of rules issued by the state rather than the
family.
Kathy Baker comments on Roberts's analysis of kinship care by
praising in general many arrangements that challenge the assignment
of responsibility for the care of dependents to nuclear families. For
Baker, that means that kinship foster care is superior to the old Aid
to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"), because AFDC
reinforced the notion that care work was a nuclear family
responsibility. Kinship foster care, by making payments for care
outside of the nuclear family, participates in spreading that
responsibility to creative caretaking networks.
Baker wonders
whether any state support for caregiving that involves cash subsidies
only to parents or primary caretakers reinforces the primary
caretaker norm-just the norm that Joan Williams seeks to use in
favor of social support for care work. Baker would rather see support
in the form of in-kind government services, such as access to medical
insurance, housing assistance, mental health treatment, and parental
drug treatment. She would like to see subsidies that actively
encourage parents to share their childcare responsibilities with others
in order to expand the horizons of both parent and child.
18. Dorothy E. Roberts, Kinship Care and the Price of State Support for Children, 76 CHI.KENT L. REv. 1619, 1632 (2001).
19. Id. at 1639.
20. Id. at 1640.
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Mary Romero next enters with an article that invites us to
examine care work from the perspective of the paid caregiver, and
more significantly, that caregiver's children. She asks us to see the
rise of the "work and family conflict" as an expression of a number of
social movements and dislocations, rather than simply a result of
more women entering the labor force or the gendered division and
devaluation of care work.21 These influences include corporate
reorganization that eroded workers' confidence, declining government benefits that meant more wages per family were required, and
the other forces that have caused worker hours to expand. These
broad trends are experienced by individuals as work-family conflict.
The individualized approach to remedying the need for time to work
does not eliminate the conflicts produced by these trends, it simply
shifts them to more vulnerable and less protected groups. In
particular, she is concerned about shifting the care crisis onto the
shoulders of paid domestic workers, drawn from the ranks of the
more socially disadvantaged groups in our culture, low-income,
African American and immigrant women. The only way to avoid this
shift is to look to solutions that fundamentally reorganize the
economy. Romero undertakes this investigation by looking at the
way children of paid domestic workers view the care their mothers
give to the children of their employers. Through this lens, Romero is
able to bring to light some of the particularly damaging effects of
domesticity, including its norm of intensive mothering, where it is
provided by a paid caregiver. Romero argues that when employers
hire substitute mothers under inferior working conditions, they "are
purchasing services crucial to both the reproduction of their families
'2
and to the social reproduction of privilege.
Turning from the investigations of issues surrounding care work
as practiced offered by White, Roberts, and Romero, Linda McLain
closes the Symposium with a reflection on the concept of care as a
public value.
She writes from within the discourse on civic
republicanism, arguing that government's formative project-its
responsibility to prepare persons for democratic and personal selfgovernment to help them live good lives-should include a
recognition that affirming care as a public value is a precondition to
civic and democratic life. From that perspective she critiques the

21. Mary Romero, Unraveling Privilege: Workers' Children and the Hidden Costs of Paid
Childcare,76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1651, 1654 (2001).
22. Id. at 1671.
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definition of personal responsibility offered by the welfare reform
discourse. She argues instead that
[w]hat is needed is a more sustained focus upon the role of care in
fostering human and social capital and a rejection of the simple
equation of personal responsibility and good citizenship with
market participation, without attending to the other responsibilities
23
adults must honor and the other roles they must fulfill.
She joins Susan Moller Okin and Eva Kittay in arguing that John
Rawls's version of political liberalism does not "make explicit enough
the fact of human dependency and the importance of caregiving and
caring relationships to human development. ' 24 By focusing on
families as "seedbeds of civic virtue," as the civil society literature
does, a different function of the family is glossed over-that of
providing necessary care?2
Without fully offering an institutional
design for recognizing care as a public value, McLain argues that we
should do so "in a way that does not replicate the inequality and
injustice of the gendered care economy that has characterized much
of this nation's history, nor the devaluing of care in law and public
policy. 2 6 She reflects positively on Nancy Fraser's idea of a
"universal caregiver" 27 model (as distinct from universal breadwinner
model) that seeks a redesign of workplaces to allow workers to meet
both wage-earning and caregiving responsibilities. Finally, although
she believes it has not yet arrived at its full potential and may be
troubling in its current expression, McLain sees hope for
transformation in parenting roles in the recent "responsible
fatherhood" movement.
Both Martha Ertman and Mary Anne Case comment on McLain.
Ertman wonders if liberal theory can accommodate care as a public
value, as liberalism embraces individualism and autonomy so
thoroughly. She worries that resting care as a public value on the
notion that care of children creates citizens may make the citizenship
of the caregiver derivative, grounded in the citizens it creates rather
than the citizenship of the caregiver in her own right. She is
concerned that making care a public value may allow the majoritarian
middle to define the family, as public decision making involves high
levels of government oversight and intrusion. The state's preferred
23. Linda C. McClain, Care As a Public Value: Linking Responsibility, Resources, and
Republicanism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1673, 1679 (2001).
24. Id. at 1685.
25. Id. at 1690.
26. Id. at 1698.
27. Id.
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family, Ertman worries, is and will be the heterosexual, two-parent
family. Ertman prefers private law as a mechanism for gaining
support for caregivers. She prefers contract as a mechanism to
achieve remuneration, because private law, conceived by individuals
rather than the collective, is friendlier to a proliferation of family
forms.
In her commentary, Mary Anne Case worries that employer
support for caregiving through accommodation of childrearing in
particular will disadvantage workers without children, and specifically
women workers without children, who will be required to do the extra
work which mothers who receive workplace accommodations are
relieved of. Case wants to see the burden of the care of children
shifted from women to men, whom she believes are now the primary
beneficiaries of the range of dependent benefits, not from women to
state and market, both of which can then shift the childcare burden to
childless individuals. To the extent accommodations are made, Case
wants them to extend beyond the narrow definition of care and
support of children, to include both other dependents (such as
parents and nonmarital partners), and activities other than care
altogether. Case's article challenges us to ask how care compares
with other needs of workers for time, pay, and dignity.
This Symposium opens many avenues for further debate. The
reader will have to enter the Symposium to see the range of themes
suggested, but I will briefly raise a few of them here. First, there is an
overwhelming concern from all of the authors about the gender
inequities created by our current care work system. At the same
time, in thinking through remedies, there is a serious risk that care
work, which is poorly remunerated in nursing homes, daycare centers,
and private homes, is being delegated to the most economically and
politically vulnerable workers (overwhelmingly women) in the paid
labor market. What was gender stratification in the family becomes
class and race stratification where care work is shifted to the market.
For some this is an argument for returning more care work to families
on an unpaid basis, where for others it is an argument for raising the
status and wages of paid caregivers. The risk, though, is that a policy
or theoretical promise to prevent care work from remaining one of
the lowest paid forms of work will not be implemented. The
likelihood of failure in that promise is exacerbated because the shift
to the market occurs incrementally, as private individuals solve the
individual problems created for them by the choices the system offers.
Institutional thinking on the problems created by the care work crisis
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has to be influenced by the possibility that, despite theoretical and
political commitments that are made to expanding the institutions
that are responsible for care work, it will continue to be specialized as
the lowest wage work in the economy. Moreover, if the wages of
childcare workers are raised and the costs past along only to parents,
rather than socially subsidized, low-income workers in need of
childcare may be further priced out of the licensed childcare market.
Second, there are quite divergent views on the role of men in
care work. At times the care work crisis is presented in battle-of-thesexes terms, with the overtone that the crisis is a creation of
individual men exploiting individual women over what ought to be
their shared care work responsibilities. This expression of the
problem can lead to more than one kind of solution. One perspective
seeks the solution to the work-family conflict through greater
paternal care work responsibility. For some, this would go far in
solving the crisis altogether. This remedy is appealing to those whose
primary interest is in achieving workplace equality for women, as
complete job integration seems only achievable under conditions of
complete role integration at home. Here the goal is that the
combined profiles of men and women, as wage workers and unpaid
care workers, should look the same. For others, the solution to the
battle of the sexes should not lie in persuading men to do more. They
believe that for a range of reasons, including an internalized greater
sense of responsibility for care work and a lack of any historical
precedent for equal sharing, women's weaker bargaining position
over care work is far more intractable than equal parenting advocates
suggest. For them, if men's lesser participation is the source of the
problem, then the creation of support systems without men's
participation is the only safe strategy. This position views the battle
of the sexes as a major problem, but women's tools in that battle
would better include an effective exit strategy through partnership
with market and state over care work, than bargaining from a weak
position in a bilateral monopoly with a coparent.
Still others suspect that the battle of the sexes, meaning unequal
participation by men in care work, is not the main source of the care
work crisis. For them, evenly splitting the work between men and
women will not change the fact that too much of the work is allocated
to the private family to begin with. If two parents are equally buried
in care work beneficial to society as a whole, such that their time for
leisure or citizenship is greatly impaired, equal sharing between
parents does not solve the more serious injustice of allocating care to
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the private family sphere to begin with. But for others whether the
work is too much or too little does not raise a substantive theoretical
problem so long as inequalities between men and women are not
created. In other words, it may be that caring for dependents is
onerously burdensome, but for some this is not a public issue unless it
is an equality issue.
Third, thoughts about the institutional design of remedies for the
care work crisis are nascent throughout the literature. Questions are
still proposed at abstracted and theoretical levels, with few details
filled in. The questions being asked now are framed in terms such as,
should we have redistribution of responsibility: among families?
between men and women? between those with dependent care
responsibilities and their employers? between dependents and
government? between caregivers and government? This is quite
distinct from articles devoted entirely to questions such as, should we
fund parental leave out of the unemployment insurance trust fund?
This is where work needs to be done, and interestingly, this
Symposium only advances that ball a little bit (Lucie White's and
Dorothy Roberts's articles, for example, are more explicitly focused
on institutional design in its practiced details than most of the others).
Yet the good news of the Symposium is the sense that the
imperative for a remedy has been reached, such that the fight is now
about what the foundational framework for that institutional design
ought to be. In a very real way, these arguments over the broad
outlines of design are philosophical debates over the deep structure of
the problem, and none are yet road-ready. But it is critical to engage
in these debates at this time, before we have committed to an
institutional design expounded in most of its particulars. Whether or
not we agree on the deep principles that would point us toward one
or another outline of a design, it is extremely productive to put all the
concerns and principled arguments over the meaning of any given
strategy on the table now. Whatever costs we do end up incurring
with any given strategy, we can at least go in with eyes wider open.
It has been a great pleasure to work on this project. I want to
thank the wonderfully devoted (and flexible) student editors of this
Symposium. They have made great personal sacrifices far beyond
their obligation in order to ensure that the Symposium reached its
highest quality potential. I also want to thank the authors, many of
whom cooperated beyond the call of duty with scheduling changes
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and substantive reorganizations, even as they themselves were subject

to countless demands on their time and energy. 28 My hope is that the
Symposium will generate more discussion on this issue among its
participants and within the legal and policy communities.

28. I regret that Peggie Smith and Adrienne Davis, who were to participate in this
Symposium, were in the end unable to due to snags in our deadline/production processes or
other unforeseen obstacles.

